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Abstract
Concerns that (1) growth in developing countries could worsen the US terms of trade and (2) that increased US trade 
with developing countries will increase US wage inequality both implicitly reﬂ  ect the assumption that goods produced 
in the United States and developing countries are close substitutes and that specialization is incomplete. In this paper we 
show on the contrary that there are distinctive patterns of international specialization and that developed and developing 
countries export fundamentally diﬀ  erent products, especially those classiﬁ  ed as high tech. Judged by export shares, the 
United States and developing countries specialize in quite diﬀ  erent product categories that, for the most part, do not 
overlap. Moreover, even when exports are classiﬁ  ed in the same category, there are large and systematic diﬀ  erences in unit 
values that suggest the products made by developed and developing countries are not very close substitutes—developed 
country products are far more sophisticated. 
Th   is generalization is already recognized in the literature but it does not hold for all types of products. Export unit values 
of developed and developing countries of primary commodity–intensive products are typically quite similar. Unit values 
of standardized (low-tech) manufactured products exported by developed and developing countries are somewhat similar. 
By contrast, the medium- and high-tech manufactured exports of developed and developing countries diﬀ  er greatly.
Th  is  ﬁ  nding has important implications. While measures of across product specialization suggest China and other Asian 
economies have been moving into high-tech exports, the within-product unit value measures indicate they are doing 
so in the least sophisticated market segments and the gap in unit values between their exports and those of developed 
countries has not narrowed over time. 
Th  ese  ﬁ  ndings shed light on the paradoxical ﬁ  nding, exempliﬁ  ed by computers and electronics, that US-manufactured 
imports from developing countries are concentrated in US industries, which employ relatively high shares of skilled 
American workers. Th   ey help explain why America’s nonoil terms of trade have improved and suggest that recently 
declining relative import prices from developing countries may not produced signiﬁ  cant wage inequality in the United 
States. Finally they suggest that inferring competitive trends based on trade balances in products classiﬁ  ed as “high tech” 
or “advanced” can be highly misleading. 
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INTRODUCTION
Recently, distinguished economists have raised doubts about the size and distribution of America’s gains 
from trade as a result of its increasing trade with developing countries. On the one hand, in an article that 
attracted considerable attention, Paul Samuelson (2004) used a conventional Ricardian model to show 
how growth in developing countries such as China could reduce America’s gains from trade. His argument 
is that as a result of productivity growth these countries could move up the technology ladder suﬃ   ciently 
to provide important competition for US exports. Th   is could induce a decline in America’s terms of trade 
and therefore its gains from trade.1 
On the other hand, Paul Krugman raised concerns about the eﬀ  ect of growing trade with 
developing countries on wage inequality: in a column in 2007 he wrote “It’s no longer safe to assert that 
trade’s impact on the income distribution in wealthy countries is fairly minor. Th   ere’s a good case that it is big 
and getting bigger.” As in Samuelson’s case, Krugman’s reasoning is based on conventional trade theory. 
Th   e crux of the concern is that the goods produced by developing countries whose relative prices have 
declined are close substitutes for those produced by unskilled labor in developed countries and therefore 
exert downward pressure on the relative wages of unskilled workers.
Actually, in the conventional two-by-two Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory framework, Samuelson and 
Krugman cannot both be correct. If the United States specializes in skill-intensive products, declining 
terms of trade will reduce skill premiums and more equal wages. But in both cases, these concerns reﬂ  ect 
the presumption that developed and developing countries compete head to head i.e., that they occupy 
similar cones of diversiﬁ  cation. 
Th   e empirical work on these concerns is, however, riddled with paradoxes. Th   e evidence of 
substantial losses in US high-tech competitiveness is hard to square with America’s improving nonoil 
terms of trade, and the evidence of increased manufactured imports from developing countries in skill-
intensive sectors is hard to square with conventional Heckscher-Ohlin theory. 
Support for Samuelson’s concern does seem to come from the data on trade in “High-technology 
Products,” reported annually by the US National Science Foundation (NSF) in its Science Indicators and 
in the data on trade in “Advanced Technology Products” reported in the monthly trade release of the 
US Department of Commerce. Th   ese data show major declines in the world market share of US high 
technology industries, from 20 percent in the early 1990s to 12 percent in 2005, primarily reﬂ  ecting 
1. Gomory and Baumol (2000) use a model with economies of scale to reach a similar conclusion.3
losses in industries producing communications equipment, oﬃ   ce machinery, and computers. By contrast 
China’s share in high-tech exports rose from 8 percent in 1999 to 19 percent in 2005 to make it by far 
the world’s largest exporter of high-technology products. In addition, America’s historically strong trade 
balance in “advanced technology products” shifted from surplus to deﬁ  cit in 2002, driven by US trade 
with developing countries such as China, Mexico, Malaysia, and Indonesia (NSF 2008).
Other research also appears to provide corroborating evidence. Schott (2008) ﬁ  nds that China’s 
export overlap with the OECD is much greater than one would predict given its low wages.2 Similarly, Rodrik 
(2006) ﬁ  nds that China’s exports are associated with a productivity level that is higher than what would 
be expected given its income. 
Despite this apparent support for Samuelson’s concern, however, excluding oil, the terms of trade in 
manufactured goods of the United States, Germany, and Japan have all actually improved since the mid-
1990s—the period when import growth from the developing countries accelerated.3 Moreover since US 
nonagricultural export prices have increased as much as the prices of US manufactured goods imported 
from industrial countries, the source of the US (nonoil) terms of trade improvement is the declining 
relative prices of manufactured imports from developing countries. 
While the evidence of declining relative prices of manufactured imports from developing countries 
may give some comfort with regard to Samuelson’s concern, it seems to provide support for Krugman’s 
worry about declining prices of unskilled labor–intensive products. But here too there are problems 
with the straightforward explanation. In apparent contradiction to conventional trade theory, the most 
disaggregated six-digit North American Industry Classiﬁ  cation System (NAICS) data indicate that 
US manufacturing industries with high shares of manufactured imports from developing countries are 
actually more skill intensive than the industries with high shares of imports from developed countries 
(Edwards and Lawrence 2010a, 2010b). Th   e rapid growth in imports of computers and electronics from 
developing countries exempliﬁ  es this contradiction. Th   ree-quarters of US imports in this sector come 
from developing countries, yet it is the most skill intensive in US manufacturing. 
Th   ere are numerous possible explanations for this puzzling result. Th  e  ﬁ  rst, favored by Krugman 
(2008), is that aggregation bias conﬂ  ates imported unskilled labor–intensive components and more skilled 
labor–intensive ﬁ  nished domestic products. Th   is therefore disguises the detrimental impact of outsourcing 
unskilled-labor processes to developing countries on the wages of US workers who are either displaced or 
engaged in unskilled labor–intensive activities within US industries.4
2. See also Kiyota (2008) who compares US, EU, and Chinese exports to Japan.
3. Edwards and Lawrence (2010a) show that even when the trade deﬁ  cit is taken into account, the US nonoil terms of 
trade have improved since the mid-1990s.
4. See also Blinder (2006) on the oﬀ  shoring of business services that sparked considerable concern about the loss of US 
services jobs.4
Four other hypotheses with diﬀ  erent implications for wage inequality than posited by Krugman 
are also worth considering. Th  e  ﬁ  rst is “factor-intensity-reversals”: US imports from developing countries 
may be produced abroad with unskilled labor–intensive methods, but in the United States ﬁ  rms have 
automated and upgraded and thus use skilled labor–intensive methods to produce the same products. A 
second possibility is that given the increased global mobility of capital and technology, contrary to the 
implications of Heckscher-Ohlin theory, developing countries have acquired comparative advantages in 
some skill-intensive goods. Th   is certainly is the impression left by the NSF Science and Commerce data 
cited above. A third possibility is that because of international supply chains, much of the value in the 
products deemed as from developing countries is actually produced in developed countries. In particular, 
imports that may arrive in the United States from developing countries like China are actually skill 
intensive because they contain large amounts of skill-intensive components and designs produced in more 
developed countries (such as Japan or the United States). A fourth possibility, though, is within category 
specialization: Domestic and imported goods are simply not close substitutes. Developing countries 
produce less skill-intensive varieties, while the United States and other developed countries produce more 
skill-intensive varieties. We have moved to a multicone world with more complete specialization than is 
assumed by conventional theory.5
In this paper we will resolve these paradoxes and distinguish among these explanations. We provide 
considerable support for the multicone explanation. We will deal with the problem of aggregation bias 
by using highly disaggregated trade data. Fortunately, these data distinguish very clearly between raw 
materials, intermediate components, and ﬁ  nished products and are therefore not as subject to aggregation 
bias. Th   ey are also reported as values and quantities, (e.g., in dozens or pounds) allowing for rough 
comparisons of prices diﬀ  erentials. Disaggregated data also allow a better understanding of the factors that 
could explain the fact that US imports from developing countries are concentrated in US industries that 
are relatively skilled labor intensive. In addition, since the ﬁ  rst four explanations all assume that developed 
and developing country exports (or tasks) are similar (perfect substitutes) we will use disaggregated unit 
value data to help us distinguish the ﬁ  fth explanation—imperfect substitutes—from the others.
One method we will use to determine head-to-head product competition in our eﬀ  ort to resolve 
these questions is to calculate a “similarity index” that captures the degree to which products share the 
same detailed classiﬁ  cation categories. Th   is allows us to explore across-product specialization in trade ﬂ  ows. 
Fortunately we can compile very ﬁ  ne-grained measures of similarity because the United States reports 
trade data in highly disaggregated 6- and 10-digit Harmonized Tariﬀ   System (HTS) categories. For 
example, the 10-digit HTS import category number 6103106030 contains values of “cotton waistcoats 
imported as parts of suits.” 
5. Support for this conclusion can be found in Schott 2003.5
However, even at the 10-digit HTS level the data still reﬂ  ect aggregation of products of diﬀ  erent 
quality. For example, cotton waistcoats are not all created equal. Indeed, some may have much higher 
quality and diﬀ  erent product attributes (e.g., silver versus gold buttons) than others. Th  ese  diﬀ  erences 
should be reﬂ  ected in diﬀ  erent prices. Accordingly, we use a second method, ratios of average unit values 
at the most disaggregated level (typically either 10- or 6-digit HTS level) to distinguish between products 
even more precisely. Th   is measure captures within-product specialization.
Data
To undertake this examination we concentrate on US trade in manufactured goods, (NAICS 331–333) 
dropping reﬁ  ned petroleum products from the data. We use the US trade data provided by Feenstra, 
Romalis, and Schott (2002) and the United States International Trade Commission. Th   e data are highly 
disaggregated. Th   ere are about 9,000 export codes and approximately 12,000 import numbers. To exploit 
the US data we assume that the goods foreigners export to the United States that are captured in US 
import data are representative of the goods they generally export to the rest of the world. We also assume 
that the goods the US exports are representative of goods manufactured in the United States. 
Results 
We will show in this paper that there are distinctive patterns of international specialization that suggest 
developed and developing countries produce fundamentally diﬀ  erent products. Judged by export shares, 
the US and developing countries specialize in quite diﬀ  erent product categories that for the most part 
do not overlap. Moreover, even when they do overlap and exports are classiﬁ  ed in the same category, 
there are large and systematic diﬀ  erences in unit values that suggest the products made by developed 
and developing countries are not very close substitutes—developed country products are far more 
sophisticated. 
Th   is generalization does not hold for all types of products. We ﬁ  nd that export unit values of 
primary commodity-intensive products are typically quite similar and unit values of standardized 
manufactured products exported by developed and developing countries are not very diﬀ  erent. But the 
medium- and high-tech manufactured exports of developed and developing countries diﬀ  er greatly. 
In these product categories export unit values rise with per capita incomes and there is little evidence 
of substantial convergence over time. Th   is suggests that, especially in these products, developed and 
developing countries are not competing through producing goods that are close substitutes.6 Measures 
of across-product specialization suggest China and other Asian economies have been moving into high-
tech exports, but the within-product measures indicate they are doing so in the least sophisticated market 
segments. 
6. Th   e product cycle theory of Vernon (1966) is one way to explain these ﬁ  ndings. 6
Th  e  ﬁ  ndings have important implications for our concerns. Th   ey bolster the argument that the 
United States and the developing countries are not competing head to head in export markets. Th  ey 
shed light on the paradoxical ﬁ  nding, exempliﬁ  ed by computers and electronics, that US-manufactured 
imports from developing countries are concentrated in industries that employ relatively high shares of 
skilled American workers and help explain why recently declining relative import prices from developing 
countries have not produced signiﬁ  cant wage inequality (Lawrence 2008).
Other research provides support for these conclusions. Peter Schott in particular has been a major 
contributor to this type of work. He argues that international patterns of specialization are incompatible 
with the assumption, common in traditional trade theory, that countries all produce the same products. 
Instead, there are diﬀ  erent cones of specialization that reﬂ  ect diﬀ  erences in factor endowments (Schott 
2003). He also ﬁ  nds that the diﬀ  erences in unit value of exports to the United States between developed 
and developing countries are systematic and can be ascribed to diﬀ  erences in factor endowments and factor 
production intensities (Schott 2004).7 Schott (2008) ﬁ  nds that the overlap between China’s exports to the 
United States and OECD exports to the United States exceed what one would expect given its wage rate, 
but that its unit values are substantially lower than those of OECD exports again suggesting a high degree 
of within-product specialization. Liu (2006) and Kiyota (2008) have both used similar disaggregated data 
to directly explore competition between US and Chinese exports in world and Japanese markets and reach 
similar conclusions: the United States and China occupy diﬀ  erent parts of the export market.
EXPORT OVERLAP
We ﬁ rst explore the overlap between US exports and foreign exports to the United States using the 
data on commodity shares for 1990, 2000, and 2006. Like Schott (2008) in his analysis of the rising 
sophistication of Chinese exports to the United States, we measure the overlap in trade ﬂ  ows using 
indices of similarity at various levels of disaggregation. Whereas Schott benchmarks the composition of 
developing country exports to the United States against OECD exports to the United States, we extend 
this by also comparing the similarity of US exports and foreign exports to the United States. 
Th   e similarity index ﬁ  rst involves calculating shares of each commodity and then summing the 
absolute diﬀ  erence in these shares.8 If Xi is the share of commodity i in X and Yi the share of commodity i 
in country Y then we ﬁ  rst calculate the absolute diﬀ  erence in the share of each commodity.
i.e., Xi – Yi |
7. Th   is result is also consistent with research by Harrigan (2000) showing that US producer prices did not fall substantially 
as a result of the Asian ﬁ  nancial crisis, which lowered the world prices of many labor-intensive goods.
8. An alternative approach developed by Finger and Kreinin (1979) sums the minimum share for each commodity and 
produces an index in which confusingly 100 implies complete similarity and zero implies no overlap. See also Sun and Ng 
(2000).7
We then sum these diﬀ  erences and divide by two to provide a similarity index SIXY between X and 
Y, which is equal to 100 when the two series are completely diﬀ  erent and equal to zero when they are 
completely similar.
SIXY = ∑ | Xi – Yi | /2
        i
Consider, for example if there were just two commodities and two countries. If each fully specialized 
in exporting one of the products, the columns would be (0, 100) and (100, 0) and the index would 
measure 100 indicating no overlap. If both specialized in the same product, the columns would be (100, 
0) and (100, 0) and the index would register zero indicating complete similarity. 
One weakness in the measure is that it is sensitive to the level of disaggregation. Both countries 
might have half their exports in clothing, for example, and a measure at this level would indicate complete 
similarity, but one country might only be exporting shirts while the other only exports pants and this 
diﬀ  erence would show up if more disaggregated data was to be used. Accordingly we have calculated 
these indices at the most disaggregated level possible. Th   e comparison of developing-country exports to 
the United States with aggregate high-income OECD exports to the United States is based on a time 
consistent 10-digit HTS classiﬁ  cation constructed using the concordance mapping of Pierce and Schott 
(2009).9 Th   e comparison of foreign exports with aggregate US exports is based on 6-digit Harmonized 
System (HS) code as the 10-digit US export and import codes are not directly comparable.10 
Table 1 reports the various export similarity indices for a selection of developed and developing 
countries in 1990, 2000, and 2006. We compare US imports from these countries with US imports from 
high-income OECD countries. We also compare the similarity of US imports with aggregate US exports. 
Th   e two diﬀ  erent comparisons yield remarkably similar results both in terms of the level and trend of 
the indices. Looking at the data for 2006, it is clear that in the sample Vietnamese exports are the most 
diﬀ  erent from those of the United States and high-income OECD countries. Next most diﬀ  erent are 
those from Hong Kong and then India. China and the category of other developing countries occupy 
intermediate positions, while developed countries such as Germany, Japan, and the category of “other 
developed countries” have the most similar structure to US exports. 
Th   e ordering of export similarity is broadly consistent with GDP per capita with exports from 
low-income countries displaying the least overlap with OECD exports and aggregate US exports, but 
exceptions are evident.11 Surprisingly, Hong Kong’s export similarity with the OECD and the United 
9. Th   e HTS classiﬁ  cation has been revised on numerous occasions to reﬂ  ect the development of new products. To ensure 
comparability across time, we convert all the HTS data to a time-consistent code using the concordance map developed by 
Pierce and Schott (2009).
10. Th   e HS code is converted to the 1988/1992 revision to ensure comparability over time. 
11. Highly disaggregated econometric estimates by Schott (2008) reveal a statistically signiﬁ  cant association between 8
States was very low in 2006 despite incomes per capita similar to those in developed economies. Th  e 
composition of Korea’s and Mexico’s exports to the United States was more similar to aggregate OECD 
exports than France’s export bundle (and the United Kingdom in the case of Korea) in 2006, but this 
ordering is reversed in the comparison with aggregate US exports. 
Th   e change in similarity over time is also interesting. Th   e export similarity of China, India, and 
Korea with the OECD and United States rose rapidly from 1990 to 2006 (see also ﬁ  gure 1). China, 
for example, rose from a low similarity position in 1990 to an intermediate position in 2006, but 
nevertheless remains more similar to other developing economies than developed countries including the 
United States. Schott (2008) also estimates that the rise in China’s export similarity with the OECD is 
not exceptional and is consistent with predictions based on its size and level of development. A further 
observation is that almost the entire increase in China’s export similarity took place between 1990 and 
2000, with very little change in similarity from 2000 to 2006—a period in which US imports from China 
rose dramatically. Exports from Korea and India, in contrast, showed a steady increase in similarity with 
the OECD and aggregate US exports in both periods. 
Overall, the similarity indices reveal a rising export similarity between many developing countries 
and the OECD and the United States. Th   ese trends are nevertheless not fully supportive of Samuelson’s 
concerns. Th   e rising similarity is broadly consistent with improvements in per capita growth in these 
countries and does not reﬂ  ect exceptional increases in competition with US exports in recent years. 
Further, developing-country export similarity with the United States continues to be lower than for 
developed countries. Even developed countries show a fairly high degree of dissimilarity with US exports 
(typically around 50).
A comparison of cumulative import shares in table 2 corroborates this ﬁ  nding. China has been the 
focus of considerable attention in the debate on the eﬀ  ect of emerging economies on US welfare. We have 
therefore ranked products according to their shares in Chinese exports to the United States in 2006 and 
then sorted the other trade data by these rankings. Finally we cumulate the shares accounted for at each 
percentile of Chinese rankings. Table 2 compares China’s manufacturing exports to the United States with 
those of other countries according to these cumulative shares. 
Th   e data reveal the weak overlap in the export bundles of developing countries with the United 
States and other developed countries. Products that accounted for 50 percent of US imports from China 
in 2006 made up just 8 percent of US imports from high-income OECD countries and 11 percent of 
US exports. In contrast, these products accounted for 52 percent of US imports from the Association of 
GDP per capita and export similarity with the OECD. In his simple regressions, China’s export similarity to the OECD 
is greater than what would be predicted on the basis of its income per capita. However, China is no longer found to be an 
outlier after jointly controlling for size and level of development.9
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN-4) category, 37 percent from Vietnam, but less than 10 percent from 
India and the category for “other developing countries.” Interestingly, these products made up 27 (Hong 
Kong) to 56 (Singapore) percent of US imports from selected high-income Asian economies suggesting 
Chinese export growth to the United States may be at the expense of exports from these countries rather 
than other high-income economies, including the United States. 
A similar story is evident if we look at products accounting for 80 percent of Chinese imports. Th  ese 
constituted just 21 percent of US imports from high-income OECD countries and 23 percent of US 
exports in 2006, but up to 76 percent of US imports from the ASEAN-4 and over 47 percent from the 
selected high-income Asian economies. It is clear from these results that by and large the goods the United 
States imports from China are very diﬀ  erent from those that it exports or that are exported to the United 
States by high-income countries outside of Asia. Most Chinese exports are not competing with US or 
other developed-country exports. 
UNIT VALUES
Another indicator of similarity is unit values. If US exports or imports from developed countries are 
similar to exports from developing countries in quality, composition, and price we would expect them 
to have similar unit values. In this section we investigate the similarity in unit values across countries 
using the highly disaggregated data drawn on in the earlier analysis.12 As we will show, unit values of US 
imports from developing countries are substantially lower than those of equivalent products imported 
from high-income OECD countries and products exported by the United States. Further, unlike the 
export similarity indices that indicate rising across-product similarity in the export bundle of developing 
countries with aggregate US exports, the unit value analysis ﬁ  nds no such convergence. All told, these 
results convey a picture in which developed and developing countries tend to specialize in exporting 
diﬀ  erent types of products.
Th   e analysis is based on annual data from 1990 to 2006. Unit values of imports from foreign 
countries are compared to import unit values from high-income OECD countries as well unit values 
of aggregate US exports. In the comparison with the OECD, we ﬁ  rst calculate the ratios of unit values 
using 10-digit data. We then weight the 10-digit unit value ratios by the annual share of each product in 
total US imports from high-income OECD countries.13 For the comparison with US export unit values, 
12. Th   ere are a number of data quality issues that arise in using this data. Errors in measurement can result in highly 
volatile unit value measures. Th   e units of measurement are also not applied consistently over all periods and across 
countries. In what follows, we deal with outliers in unit values by eliminating the top and bottom 1 percent of data ranked 
according to price level. In constructing relative unit values, we also ensure that we only compare products measured using 
the same units. Note that in doing so, we eliminate the measurement units and hence are able to aggregate up the relative 
unit value indicator. 
13. Th   is measure therefore also captures the eﬀ  ect of changes in the US import bundle over time. Th   e alternative is to use 10
we use 6-digit HS data and annual US export values as weights. Th   e advantage of using OECD import 
unit values as the reference price is that we are able to present a much ﬁ  ner resolution of the relative price 
relationship. 
Even at the ten-digit level, unit values are imprecise measures. In particular, relatively high values 
could indicate higher prices for similar products, higher quality, or within any category, a larger share 
of products with higher unit values. Nonetheless, as reported in table 3 below the results are quite 
remarkable, and correlate very strongly with levels of development. 
Our selected countries are clearly grouped into two categories, particularly when import unit values 
are compared against US exports. Th   e import unit values of high-income countries—such as the United 
Kingdom, France, the category for “other developed countries,” Japan, and Germany—on average equal 
or exceed US export unit values by up to 60 percent (see ﬁ  gure 2). Th   ere is some movement in their 
relative price ratios over time, but in most cases the price relative to US exports is not too dissimilar in 
2006 from 1990. US import unit values from Singapore are the exception rising from 64 percent of US 
export unit values in 1990 to 119 percent in 2006. 
Looking at unit values relative to high-income OECD imports, we also see relative prices in excess 
of 1 for most high-income countries, but in this case we see a slight decline in the relative price over 
the period 1990–2006, perhaps reﬂ  ecting rising convergence of prices within European countries who 
account for a high proportion of high-income OECD trade. Engel and Rogers (2004), for example, ﬁ  nd 
that retail prices converged in European markets, particularly in the 1990s. 
Th   e second grouping covers the low and middle-income countries as well as some of the high-
income Asian economies such as Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Looking ﬁ  rst at China, it is striking 
that Chinese import unit values at the product level have hardly changed relative to OECD imports and 
aggregate US exports over the entire period. On average, Chinese import unit values were 43 percent of 
OECD import values and 34 percent of US export unit values in 2006, which is insigniﬁ  cantly diﬀ  erent 
from the relative unit values in the early 1990s. Th   e rising similarity in across-product composition of 
Chinese exports to the OECD and the United States is therefore not replicated in the relative price data, 
an observation also found by Schott (2008).
trade weights for a ﬁ  xed period, but this leads to the elimination of all products not exported in all years. Th  is  potentially 
eliminates a high proportion of trade from the calculation, if growth occurs through exports of new products rather than 
increased exports of existing products. Th   ere is some evidence for this eﬀ  ect. Product market penetration (share of total 
products exported) by developing countries into the US market rose rapidly from 1990 to 2006. For example, the share 
of products (at 6-digit HS level) exported by China rose from 53 percent in 1990 to 90 percent in 2006. Th  e  equivalent 
share for the ASEAN-4 and India rose from 42 percent and 32 percent in 1990 to 64 percent and 69 percent in 2006, 
respectively. However, the extensive growth arising from exports of new products accounted for between 5 to 6 percent 
of overall export growth in these periods, except for India where it accounted for 17 percent of export growth. Th  e 
implication is that the weighted average, using annual export values as weights, does not diﬀ  er substantially from those 
using ﬁ  xed weights. 11
Unit values of imports from India, Mexico, and countries in the ASEAN-4 relative to the high-
income OECD category and the United States are also low and relatively stable over time, ranging from 
40 percent to 60 percent of the price of US exports. Surprisingly, relative unit values of imports from 
Taiwan, Korea, and especially Hong Kong are similar to the selected low- and middle-income countries, 
despite their relatively high incomes per capita. Th   ese newly industrialized Asian economies have 
therefore faced a rising similarity in exports to the United States with China, which has been combined 
with relative prices similar to those of developing Asian countries. Th   is raises the possibility that that 
Samuelson’s concerns about the eﬀ  ect of developing-country growth on welfare is being played out within 
newly industrialized Asian economies rather than industrialized Europe and North America. 
Th   e relative similarity in unit values amongst Asian developing and new industrialized Asian 
economies may also explain why production fragmentation and outsourcing has not raised the export unit 
values of developing Asian economies. According to our data, widespread relocation of production from 
industrialized Europe or North America to Asia would be expected to raise within-product unit values 
in these countries. In contrast, production fragmentation—being driven by the relocation of production 
from newly industrialized Asian economies to their developing neighbors—would have a much smaller 
impact on within-product unit values in the developing countries. 
Another exception is the category for “other developing countries.” Import unit values from 
other developing countries are very similar to US export unit values in all periods and show a slight 
increase relative to high-income OECD imports. Th  is  reﬂ  ects a product composition eﬀ  ect. As shown 
in table 2, there is a very low overlap in imports from other developing countries and China. Additional 
disaggregated analysis reveals that imports of nonpetroleum manufactures from other developing 
countries are concentrated in textiles and clothing (27 percent) and base metals (23 percent). Th  ese 
products show relatively little variation in prices across countries including relative to US exports. 
Th   e primary source of price diﬀ  erences across countries is in the machinery, transport, and specialized 
equipment sectors. We explore this further in the disaggregated analysis presented later.
Finally, we formally test for the relationship between exporter income and within-product price 
variation by regressing the weighted average unit value relative to the United States (ln(Pc/Pc
US)) on the log 
of GDP per capita (in constant 2000 purchasing power parity prices) (ln(GDPPC)c) using 2000 data and 
152 countries. Our results presented below are consistent with those of Schott (2004).14 
ln(Pc/Pc
US) = –4.4 + 0.42 ln(GDPPC)c , R2 = 0.49, Obs = 152
se                 (0.72) (0.07)
and 
14. Th   e regression is weighted by the 2000 share of each country in US imports. Th   e standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. 12
ln(Pc/Pc
US) = –3.5 + 0.33 ln(GDPPC)c –0.51 Dchina, R2 = 0.56, Obs = 152
se                 (0.65) (0.06)                 (0.16)
We ﬁ nd a positive and statistically signiﬁ  cant association between a country’s GDP per capita and its 
weighted average price of exports to the United States relative to aggregate US exports. We also reestimate 
the equation but include a dummy variable for China to identify whether its relative prices diﬀ  er 
signiﬁ  cantly from predictions. Like Schott (2008) we ﬁ  nd that Chinese products trade at a substantial 
discount (51 percent) given its GDP per capita. However, once we include population, the dummy 
variable is no longer signiﬁ  cant, as is also found by Schott (2008). 
All told, these results convey a picture in which developed and developing countries tend to 
specialize in exporting diﬀ  erent types of products. Nevertheless, by looking at averages of all the data, we 
are perhaps missing some of the important insights that would be better obtained by focusing on more 
disaggregated classiﬁ  cations of the data. We therefore shift our focus to a more disaggregated analysis. In 
the following section we evaluate developing country exports to the United States according to various 
measures of product sophistication. We then look more closely at the top 50 NAICS six-digit level exports 
of China to the US in 2006. 
Th   e conclusions already drawn do not change. While the sophistication of developing-country 
exports to the US has risen, price levels of these sophisticated products remain a fraction of US export 
prices. Much of the action in terms of import penetration by developing countries, and China in 
particular, occurs within the NAICS category 334 Computer & Electronic Product Manufacturing. 
Nonetheless, the average Chinese unit value within these products was around a third of the average for 
the United States. Other top exports from China were also only a fraction of the price of US exports. Th  is 
provides further evidence of a high degree of within-product specialization by developing and developed 
countries. 
PRODUCT COMPOSITION ACCORDING TO LEVEL OF SOPHISTICATION 
Th   e concern about emerging-economy exports to the United States is not only that they are becoming 
more similar to US exports in general, but that the rising similarity has been driven by rapid increases in 
exports in the same “sophisticated” products exported by the United States. 
If production and export of sophisticated products stimulates an acceleration in overall growth of 
the economy and supply of these very products, as is argued by Lall (2000) and Hausmann, Hwang, 
and Rodrik (2007), then the sophistication of the current structure of exports is a foreshadow of 
competitiveness pressures that are to come.
What is meant by sophistication is often not clear and can cover the use of sophisticated production 
processes to produce a good or the export of goods that embody sophisticated goods. Even the highly 13
disaggregated product classiﬁ  cation used by the US International Trade Commission is insuﬃ   cient to 
perfectly isolate the production process from product composition. Further, as shown in the relative price 
analysis, there is substantial within-product variation in quality. We nevertheless draw on two measures 
of sophistication: a product technology classiﬁ  cation developed by Lall (2000) and an export productivity 
measure developed by Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007). 
Our ﬁ  rst indicator of the sophistication of foreign exports to the United States draws on the 
technological classiﬁ  cation of exports developed by Lall (2000) which is described in table 4. Resource-
based (RB) manufactures tend to be simple and labor intensive or intensive in use of natural resources. 
Low-technology (LT) manufactures tend to be undiﬀ  erentiated products that compete on price (hence 
labor costs are important) and are produced using stable, well-diﬀ  used technologies. Medium-technology 
(MT) products comprise the bulk of skill- and scale-intensive technologies in capital goods and 
intermediate products and tend to have complex technologies with moderately high levels of R&D, 
advanced skill needs, and lengthy learning periods. Finally, high-technology (HT) products have advanced 
and fast-changing technologies with high R&D investments and require sophisticated technology 
infrastructures and high levels of specialized technical skills. 
In all categories there are exceptions (e.g., amongst RB products the synthesis of fuel from coal 
requires skill-intensive technologies), but in general the skill requirements tend to rise with the degree 
of technological complexity. Lall (2000) also argues that the potential for productivity-led growth, as 
opposed to growth through factor accumulation, rises with the degree of technological complexity. He, 
for example, argues that technology-intensive trade structures oﬀ  er better prospects for future growth as 
their products grow faster in trade and have larger spillover eﬀ  ects in terms of generating capabilities that 
can be used in other activities. His argument is therefore similar to that of Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) 
and Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007), who use a diﬀ  erent measure of sophistication.
Table 5 outlines the 1990 and 2006 share structure of US manufacturing imports for China, other 
low- and middle-income countries, and high-income OECD countries according to the technological 
classiﬁ  cation. Th   e table reveals the diverse patterns of specialization across regions as well as the 
remarkable shift in the composition of US imports from low- and middle-income countries toward 
medium- and high-technology products. High-income countries’ exports to the United States are 
concentrated in medium- and high-technology manufactures and there has been little change in this 
structure over the full period. 
Contrast this with Chinese exports to the United States. In 1990, 74 percent of US imports of 
manufactured goods from China were accounted for by low-technology products (mainly clothing) 
and only 7 percent by high-technology products. By 2006, high-technology products accounted for 
35 percent of US imports of manufactured goods from China with all of the increase attributable to 14
electronics and electrical products. Th   e share of high-technology products in US imports from the 
category other low- and middle-income countries also rose, but at a slower pace from 18 to 25 percent. 
Th   e sophistication of Chinese export bundles to the United States appears to be exceptional. Th  is 
is also the conclusion of Rodrik (2006) who ﬁ  nds that China’s export proﬁ  le to the world is especially 
skewed toward products where high-income countries have a comparative advantage.15 Replicating his 
approach using foreign exports to the United States (ﬁ  gure 3), we also ﬁ  nd that Chinese manufactured 
exports were associated with an income level (EXPY)16 that was six times higher than its GDP per capita 
in 2000.17 In 1990, the income level associated with its export bundle was 10 times its GDP per capita, 
but rapid growth (relative to growth in EXPY) reduced this to a factor of 3.7 by 2006. Th  us  while 
Chinese growth is converging on the income level associated with its export bundle to the United States, 
the gap nevertheless remains sizable and suggestive of substantial additional capacity for economic growth. 
China is not alone in the exceptional sophistication of its export bundle to the United States. Figure 
3 reveals that the export proﬁ  le of many other emerging and newly industrialized economies is more 
sophisticated than what is predicted on the basis of their per capita income. Th   ese countries include 
Th   ailand, Mexico, Malaysia, Korea, and less so India and Indonesia. All these countries, including China, 
experienced rising income levels associated with their export bundles from 1990 to 2006, reﬂ  ecting a shift 
in the composition of exports to the United States toward higher productivity sectors. 
Th   e rising technology intensity of emerging and newly industrialized country exports to the United 
States appear to conﬁ  rm Samuelson’s concerns about head-to-head competition with the United States 
in those products where the United States has a comparative advantage. However, as discussed earlier, 
rising sophistication of exports, as measured using trade value data, may obscure a high degree of within-
product specialization. We therefore reevaluate the apparent rise in sophistication of emerging and newly 
industrialized country exports to the United States using unit value data. 
15. He also argues that China’s composition of exports reﬂ  ects production- and technology-oriented policies, not 
comparative advantage.
16. Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) developed a measure, termed EXPYc of the productivity level associated with country c’s 
export bundle. Th   is indicator is an export share–weighted average of commodity level measures of productivity (PRODYi), 
which in turn reﬂ  ect the weighted average incomes of the countries exporting that commodity. Th   erefore, products which 
account for a high share of exports by high income per capita countries will be characterized by a high PRODY. In a 
subsequent paper Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) show that their measure of EXPY is also a good predictor of 
future growth. 
17. Commodity level PRODY is calculated using UNComtrade data for 2000 and 2001. Th   e indices are calculated at the 
HS six-digit level using the H0 1988/1992 revision. GDP per capita, measured in constant 2000 purchasing power parity 
prices, is used as the income variable and is obtained from World Development Indicators. Countries are only used if trade 
data are available in both periods. A total of 147 countries are used. Only manufactured products (NAICS 31–33) are 














jl M m  is the 
share of product l in country j’s total manufacturing exports to the United States.15
We present three diagrams of the weighted average unit value of US imports relative to US exports 
for manufactured goods over the period 1990–2006. Figure 4 focuses on US imports from China, ﬁ  gure 
5 focuses on the aggregate import unit values from low- and middle-income countries, while ﬁ  gure 
6 looks at import unit values from high-income OECD countries. In all cases, relative prices are ﬁ  rst 
calculated at the six-digit HS level and then aggregated according to their technology classiﬁ  cation using 
annual US export values as weights. We are therefore comparing average within-product price diﬀ  erences 
assuming that the structure of trade reﬂ  ects that of US exports. Note that we therefore do not account 
for across-product specialization and these weighted average relative unit value measures therefore 
underrepresent the overall degree of specialization.
We ﬁ rst look at Chinese and low- and middle-income country import unit values relative to US 
exports. Th   e relative price measures are neatly grouped into two categories. Th   e relative price of resource-
based and low-technology products ranges between 0.5 and 1.2 for China and 0.8 and 1.2 for all 
developing economies. Th   is is expected as these products, particularly resource-based products, tend to be 
relatively undiﬀ  erentiated. Product diﬀ  erentiation is not a key determinant of the competitiveness of these 
products. 
Th   is is contrasted by medium- and high-technology products. Th   e unit values of US import 
from China of these products lies between 15 and 30 percent of the equivalent products exported by 
the United States. Further, remarkably, there has been no signiﬁ  cant movement in these relative prices 
over the entire 16 years covered in the sample. Looking at the average for all low- and middle-income 
countries, the level of relative prices is slightly higher than for China alone, but there is also no change in 
the trend over time. 
Contrast these diagrams with ﬁ  gure 6 comparing the unit values of high-income OECD imports 
with aggregate US exports. US imports of medium- and high-technology manufactures from high-income 
OECD countries are on average 80 percent of the unit value of the equivalent product exported by the 
United States. Resource-based and low-technology import unit values are 30 to 90 percent higher (and 
increasing over time for resource-based products) than the equivalent aggregate US export price. 
Th  ese  ﬁ  ndings are not a particular outcome of our choice of technology classiﬁ  cation or reference 
price. We replicate these ﬁ  ndings if we compare foreign unit values to US import unit values from high-
income OECD countries as opposed to aggregate US export prices. Classifying products according to the 
sophistication measure of Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) leads to the same conclusion. Th   e unit values 
of US imports of low productivity products (PRODY) from low- and middle-income countries (and 
China alone) are between 80 to 100 percent of aggregate US export unit values in 2006. Amongst high 
productivity products (top 20 percent) unit values are 30 to 40 percent of the equivalent US export unit 
value. 16
Such vast and sustained diﬀ  erences in US export prices and import prices of medium- and 
high-technology products from low- and middle-income countries are indicative of a high degree of 
within-product specialization. Th   ese are also the products that accounted for the dramatic rise in the 
technological intensity of developing-country exports to the United States and the increases in the 
export similarity indices shown earlier. Th   ese results imply that much of the growth and the apparent 
rise in sophistication of developing-country exports to the United States have been driven by the export 
of diﬀ  erent products to what is currently being exported by the US (and other high-income OECD 
countries). Th   e rise in sophistication of developing-country exports suggested by their rising technology 
intensity of trade volumes is thus exaggerated.
DISAGGREGATED ANALYSIS
Next we drill down even further. We have assembled six-digit NAICS data for Chinese imports to the 
United States, high-income OECD imports to the United States, and US exports for 2006. We then 
rank these according to their share in US imports from China in 2006, and report the top 50 industries, 
which accounted for about 58 percent of all US-manufactured imports from China. Table 6 presents a 
comparison of unit values, relative unit values, and cumulative trade shares for these top 50 products.
Electronics sectors feature very prominently: Four of the top ﬁ  ve Chinese industries and 9 out of 
the top 50 industries come from the NAICS category 334 that covers computer and electronic products.18 
In the short space of six years, Chinese exports of 334 products increased from $24.2 billion in 2001 to 
$108.3 billion in 2007, with their share in overall US imports of these products rising from 12 to 37.2 
percent. Indeed, the $84.1 billion increase in US imports from China constituted almost all of the $88.4 
billion growth in US imports from all countries. 
Apparel, textiles, and footwear products also feature prominently, making up 16 of the top 50 
industries and 14 percent of the value of Chinese exports to the US in 2006. Th   e remaining industries are 
diverse covering, amongst others, machinery, electrical equipment, transport equipment, chemicals, wood 
products, and fabricated metal products. 
Th   e disaggregated data reinforces our earlier observation of substantial across-product and within-
product specialization of Chinese exports to the United States. Computer and electronic products (334) 
constitute a sizable share of total US manufacturing exports (16.5 percent in 2006). Yet few of the large 
US export industries in the electronics sector are also prominent export industries from China. Th  e 
strongest US performance in electronics was in semiconductors (334413), which constituted 4.3 percent 
18. Th   ey include: audio and video equipment (334310)—6.6 percent of 2006 exports; electronic computers (334111)—6 
percent; other computer equipment (334119)—5.1 percent; and wireless communications equipment (334220)—4.4 
percent.17
of US exports in 2006 but only 0.6 percent of Chinese exports to the United States in 2007. Th  e  only 
other US industry within the top 50 Chinese export industries that accounted for more than 1 percent of 
US manufacturing exports in 2006 is iron and steel mills (1.3 percent). Altogether these top 50 industries 
only made up 16.1 percent of US manufacturing exports in 2006. Similarly, the overlap of these 50 
industries with high-income OECD exports to the United States is low, accounting for 16.5 percent of 
the exports to the United States. Th   e prominent export industries of China are therefore very diﬀ  erent 
from those that dominate the export bundle of the United States and high-income OECD countries.
In addition, the prices of goods within these top 50 Chinese export industries is consistently lower 
than the equivalent price of goods exported by the United States and high-income OECD countries. For 
example, the average price per unit of audio and video equipment (334310), the top import industry 
from China in 2006, was $89. Th   e comparable price of US exports in this industry was $198 and $424 
for high-income OECD imports. Th   ere are very few instances where the Chinese price exceeds that of the 
United States (10 times) and the OECD (4 times). If we weight up the relative price data using Chinese 
import values as weights, we ﬁ  nd that products from these top 50 industries are, on average, 32 percent of 
the price of equivalent high-income OECD imports and 49 percent of the price of equivalent US exports. 
Such vast diﬀ  erences in prices suggest that China exports very diﬀ  erent products than those exported by 
high-income OECD countries and the United States. 
CONCLUSIONS
Samuelson and Krugman raised various concerns about the impact of developing countries on US welfare 
and wage inequality. In this paper we assess the evidence using highly disaggregated trade data and reasons 
to question both positions. Th   e reason is the high degree of international specialization in trade ﬂ  ows that 
suggests that aside from natural resource–intensive products such as steel, manufactured goods produced 
and exported by the United States and other developed countries are very diﬀ  erent from those exported 
by developing countries in general and China in particular.
Our ﬁ  ndings suggest that great caution is required when using of measures of “advanced-
technology” trade that are routinely produced by the US Department of Commerce in its monthly 
trade release to track performance. When imports from developing countries are important, the trade 
balances in particular high-tech products are not likely to capture competitiveness in similar products (or 
intermediates). Th   is is especially the case for information technology products.
Th   e large diﬀ  erences in prices we ﬁ  nd are indicative of a high degree of specialization. US imports 
from developing countries are not close substitutes for US exports or US imports from OECD countries. 
Th   is explains both why the US terms of trade have improved as developing countries have expanded 
their exports and why the wages of unskilled US workers have not experienced the downward pressures 18
that would have been expected if they were still producing goods that were similar to those made by 
developing countries. 
Th   e paradoxical ﬁ  nding that US imports from developing countries are concentrated in 
US industries in which skilled rather than unskilled workers have relatively high payroll shares is 
predominantly the result of intraindustry international specialization along the lines of skill. Th  e 
large and persistent diﬀ  erences in the unit values of exports from developed and developing countries 
in highly disaggregated data are inconsistent with other explanations for the paradox that assumes 
perfect substitution. Th   ese include factor-intensity reversals, aggregation bias, and claims that inputs 
from developed countries account for much of the value added contained in imports from developing 
countries.
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Table 1     Export similarity indices for manufactured goods, ranked by similarity with high-income
  OECD in 2006
Export similarity with high-income OECD country exports to 
US HS 10-digit data (1.00 is completely diff  erent) Export similarity with US exports, 6-digit data
1990 2000 2006
Change 
1990–2006 1990 2000 2006
Change 
1990–2006
Vietnam 0.97 0.92 0.96 0.93
Hong Kong 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.04 0.79 0.79 0.8 0.01
India 0.92 0.87 0.82 –0.11 0.91 0.85 0.79 –0.12
Singapore 0.82 0.82 0.81 –0.01 0.78 0.76 0.76 –0.03
ASEAN-4 0.82 0.77 0.81 –0.02 0.83 0.74 0.76 –0.07
China 0.85 0.75 0.75 –0.10 0.89 0.76 0.74 –0.14
Taiwan 0.73 0.72 0.74 0.01 0.73 0.67 0.69 –0.04
Other developing 0.78 0.76 0.74 –0.04 0.78 0.77 0.73 –0.05
France 0.69 0.67 0.68 –0.01 0.62 0.61 0.60 –0.02
Mexico 0.67 0.59 0.61 –0.06 0.70 0.63 0.63 –0.07
UK 0.59 0.56 0.57 –0.02 0.55 0.53 0.57 0.02
Korea 0.72 0.66 0.56 –0.15 0.77 0.70 0.66 –0.12
Japan 0.39 0.40 0.45 0.05 0.58 0.54 0.60 0.02
Germany 0.50 0.46 0.44 –0.06 0.59 0.53 0.53 –0.06
Other developed 0.33 0.29 0.26 –0.07 0.54 0.50 0.48 –0.06
Note: Processed petroleum products are excluded. Similarity indices based on high-income OECD countries use time-consistent HS10 code constructed 
using the concordance mapping of Pierce and Schott (2009). The indices based on US exports are calculated using time-consistent code based on the 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3     Average unit values relative to high-income OECD exports to the US and 
  aggregate US exports, ranked by price relative to OECD in 2006
Unit values relative to OECD exports Relative to US exports
1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006
UK 1.66 1.20 1.30 1.28 1.16 1.30
Singapore 1.04 0.96 1.19 0.64 0.93 1.19
Germany 1.38 1.02 1.07 1.20 0.97 1.06
Japan 1.13 1.11 1.05 1.02 1.06 1.08
Other developed 1.17 1.07 1.04 1.08 1.09 1.13
Other developing 0.74 0.89 1.00 0.97 0.95 1.08
France 1.50 1.03 0.83 1.53 1.19 1.29
ASEAN-4 0.53 0.63 0.65 0.44 0.42 0.40
Korea 0.59 0.62 0.59 0.46 0.52 0.61
Mexico 0.64 0.68 0.59 0.50 0.50 0.44
Taiwan 0.47 0.43 0.52 0.38 0.34 0.39
India 0.58 0.34 0.48 0.50 0.34 0.50
China 0.46 0.39 0.43 0.25 0.25 0.34
Vietnam 0.17 0.37 0.19 0.31
Hong Kong 0.65 0.41 0.32 0.46 0.42 0.35
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 4     The technological classifi  cation of exports
Primary products
Fresh fruit, meat, rice, cocoa, tea, coff  ee, wood, coal, crude petroleum, gas, metals
Manufactured products
RB1:  Agro/forest-based products Prepared meats/fruits, beverages, wood products, vegetable oils
RB2:  Minerals-based products Ores & concentrates, petroleum/rubber products, cement, cut gems, glass
LT1:  “Fashion cluster” Textile fabrics, clothing, headgear, footwear, leather manufactures, travel goods
LT2:  Other low-technology Pottery, simple metal parts/structures, furniture, jewelry, toys, plastic products
MT1: Automotive products Passenger vehicles and parts, commercial vehicles, motorcycles and parts
MT2: Process industries Synthetic fi  bers, chemicals and paints, fertilizers, plastics, iron, pipes/tubes
MT3: Engineering industries Engines, motors, industrial machinery, pumps, switchgears, ships, watches
HT1: Electronics and electrical products Offi   ce/data processing/telecommunications equipment, TVs, transistors, turbines, power 
generating equipment
HT2: Other high-technology Pharmaceuticals, aerospace, optical/measuring instruments, cameras
“Special” transactions
Electricity, cinema fi  lm, printed matter, art, coins, pets, non-monetary gold
RB = resource-based manufactures
LT = low-technology manufactures
MT = medium-technology manufactures
HT = high-technology manufactures
Source: Lall (2000). Authors’ calculations.23
Table 5     Share structure of US manufacturing imports by technology classifi  cation (percent)
China
1990














Resource-based manufactures 3 20 17 5 13 18
RB1: Agro/forest-based  products  1 13 12 3 8 11
RB2:  Other resource-based products  2 7 6 2 5 7
Low-technology manufactures 74 36 14 38 29 9
LT1: “Fashion  cluster”  56 29 7 23 22 3
LT2: Other  low-technology  18 7 7 15 7 7
Medium-technology manufactures 17 26 53 22 33 56
MT1: Automotive products 0 7 30 2 14 34
MT2: Process industries 2 5 6 3 7 8
MT3: Engineering industries  14 13 17 17 13 15
High-technology manufactures  7 18 15 35 25 17
HT1:  Electronics and electrical products  6 17 14 34 23 9
HT2: Other high-technology  1 1 2 1 1 9






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1     Export similarity with aggregate US manufacturing exports
Notes: Calculated using HS (Rev. 1988–1992) 6-digit data.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
  Vietnam











  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Other developed27
Figure 2     Weighted average unit values relative to US exports































































































Figure 3     Relationship between manufacturing EXPY and per-







4 6 8 10 12
ln(GDP per capita), 2000 PPP
ln(EXPY) 2000
Source: Authors’ calculations.29
Figure 4     China’s export prices relative to US exports












































































High technology  Low technology
Medium technology Resource based
Notes: Own calculations based on 6-digit HS data. Individual country average calculated using total US exports as weights. Weighted average for 
region calculated by aggregating the country level average using total bilateral import values as weights. Manufactures classifi  ed as primary products 
in the Lall technology classifi  cation are excluded from these diagrams.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 5     Low- and middle-income export prices relative to US exports


























High technology  Low technology
Medium technology Resource based
Notes: Own calculations based on 6-digit HS data. Individual country average calculated using total US exports as weights. Weighted average for 
region calculated by aggregating the country level average using total bilateral import values as weights. Manufactures classifi  ed as primary products 
in the Lall technology classifi  cation are excluded from these diagrams.
Source: Authors’ calculations.30
Figure 6     High-income OECD export prices relative to US exports







1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
High technology Low technology Medium technology Resource based
Notes: Own calculations based on 6-digit HS data. Individual country average calculated using total US exports as weights. Weighted average for region calcu-
lated by aggregating the country level average using total bilateral import values as weights. Manufactures classifi  ed as primary products in the Lall technology 
classifi  cation are excluded from these diagrams.
Source: Authors’ calculations.